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Singular perception, multiple perspectives through ‘we’: Constructing intersubjective 
meaning in English and German 
 
Richard Jason Whitt, The University of Strathclyde 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents the results of a corpus-based investigation of the role of the first-
person plural pronoun in the construction of intersubjective meaning among evidential 
perception verbs in written and spoken English and German (mainly written). 
Whereas the first-person singular pronoun only signifies that the evidence rests solely 
with the speaker/writer, the first-person plural pronoun allows a much wider range of 
intersubjective meanings concerning the nature of the evidence. It is also shown how 
English and German perception verbs express intersubjective evidential meaning in a 
number of different complementation patterns, how the type of this meaning is often 
linked to these patterns, and how the use of the first-person plural pronoun can vary 




Recent investigations into the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of perception 
verbs—those verbs denoting sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste—has revealed that 
this group of verbs provide a key means of lexical realizations of evidential meaning 
in languages such as English and German (Gisborne and Holmes 2007; Gisborne 
2010; Whitt 2009, 2010, 2011).1 Consider, for example, the following: 
 (1) a. I hear Judith singing a Petula Clark song. 
  b. Ich höre Judith ein Lied von Petula Clark singen. 
 
In (1a) and its German equivalent (1b), the speaker indicates that Judith is singing one 
of Petula Clark’s songs, and that s/he has auditory evidence that this event is taking 
place. That is, the speaker knows Judith is singing because s/he hears it happening. 
But notice how the nature of the evidence changes a bit when the first-person plural 
pronoun is used: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1Aikhenvald (2004) argues that the category of evidentiality should be restricted to 
grammatically obligatory verbal inflections, hence evidentiality cannot be said to exist 
in languages such as English and German. For counterarguments to this position, see 
Diewald and Smirnova (2010). A number of scholars (Chafe 1986; Traugott 1997; 
Smirnova 2006; Gisborne and Holmes 2007; Diewald and Smirnova 2010; Gisborne 
2010; Whitt 2010) have identified aspects of evidentiality in English and German, and 
I will do the same here. 
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 (2) a. We hear Judith singing a Petula Clark song. 
  b. Wir hören Judith ein Lied von Petula Clark singen. 
 
Here, the speaker indicates that s/he is not the only one who has heard Judith sing, but 
that an unspecified number (at least within this sentence) of other people have heard 
the event take place as well. That is, the evidence is accessible by a group of people 
rather than a single individual. 
It has been taken for granted that evidentiality is a deictic category, as it 
involves speakers (or writers) providing evidence for the propositions they utter 
(Jakobson 1957 [1971]; de Haan 2001; Joseph 2003). Therefore, a sentence such as 
Mark hears Judith singing a Petula Clark song / Markus hört Judith ein Lied von 
Petula Clark singen would not be considered evidential because the speaker is not 
indicating s/he is in possession of any particular evidence for the proposition, but 
merely that some third person has auditorily perceived an event (cf. Biber and 
Finegan’s 1989 distinction between “speaker stance” and “secondary stance”). But 
what else besides evidence does a speaker/writer (hereafter S/W) index when s/he 
uses the first-person plural pronoun as the grammatical subject of an evidential 
perception verb? It was shown in Whitt (2011) that the use of the first-person plural 
pronoun allows the S/W not only to indicate that s/he—along with others—is in 
possession of perceptual evidence, but it also allows the S/W to “engage” the 
audience with the evidence (Hyland 2005; cf. Nuyts 2001): that is, the use of the first-
person plural pronoun can allow the S/W to bring certain evidence to the audience’s 
attention, use the evidence in a persuasive manner, and perhaps even concede that 
multiple interpretations of the same perceptual evidence are possible. This variety of 
uses does not occur when the singular first-person pronoun is used. 
This essay will expand on arguments made in Whitt (2011) and focus 
exclusively on the use of the first-person plural pronoun in English (we) and German 
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(wir) with evidential perception verbs. I will first provide a general overview of 
evidential perception verbs, then focus on the notions of subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity as they relate to the first-person plural pronoun, discuss the corpora 
consulted for this study, and examine the behavior of the first-person plural pronoun 
among evidential uses of the verbs of visual (see, sehen) and auditory (hear, hören) 
perception in English and German. 
 
2. The (Evidential) Verbs of Perception 
Before embarking on our study of the first-person plural pronoun and evidential 
perception verbs, a few comments and delineations concerning this group of verbs is 
necessary. It is well known that there are five sensory modalities—sight, sound, 
touch, smell, and taste—covered by perception verbs in English and German. 
However, not all of these modalities share equal status when in comes to verb 
frequency and semantic content. In his cross-linguistic typological study of perception 
verbs, Viberg (1983) found that certain sub-groups (i.e. verbs signifying specific 
modalities) enjoyed greater frequency in usage and a higher degree of polysemy than 
others. Hence he established the following hierarchy: 
Sight > Hearing > Touch > Smell, Taste 
Thus in a number of the world’s languages, perception verbs denoting those 
modalities higher up (to the left) in the hierarchy evinced greater frequency and 
polysemy than modalities lower down in the hierarchy. These findings have been at 
least partly confirmed by later research conducted by Sweetser (1990), Harm (2000), 
and Whitt (2010). In addition, a distinction is often drawn between “subject-oriented” 
and “object-oriented” perception verbs (Viberg 1983; Harm 2000; Whitt 2009, 2010; 
cf. Gisborne 2010 for a slightly different yet not unrelated classification scheme). 
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“Subject-oriented” perception verbs are transitive verbs where the grammatical 
subject of the clause is also the perceiver, and they focus on the act of perception 
itself. Hear and hören in (1) and (2) are good examples. “Object-oriented” perception 
verbs, on the other hand, are intransitive and focus on the stimulus of perception as 
the grammatical subject of the clause, e.g. The music sounds loud. The object-oriented 
perception verbs are not irrelevant to discussions of evidentiality, but as they play a 
less significant role in constructions of collectivity and intersubjectivity than subject-
oriented verbs do (Whitt 2011), they will not be discussed further in this study. 
So what makes an perception verb evidential? It was mentioned in Section 1 
that there must be a deictic component present, whereby the S/W points to his or her 
perception as the source of information for the proposition. But since subject-oriented 
perception verbs can be evidential only when a first-person grammatical subject 
appears, we must tease out this additional deictic component from the already existing 
indexical presence of person deixis via the pronoun. Contrast (3) from (4): 
(3) a. I see the house. 
 b. Ich sehe das Haus. 
 
(4) a. I see the house burning. 
 b. Ich sehe das Haus brennen. 
 
In (3), the S/W states that s/he visually perceives a house, but this visual perception of 
an object is not evidence for some other proposition. In (4), however, this act of visual 
perception (proposition 1) provides the evidence for the second proposition in the 
sentence: namely, the house is burning. It is this additional deictic component of the 
S/W linking his or her act of perception as evidence for another proposition that is 
necessary for the perception verb to become evidential.2 The different syntactic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2This is not an uncontentious statement, as one could perhaps argue that in (3), the 
S/W’s mere perception of an object constitutes evidence for this object’s existence. 
However, my stance is that for a (subject-oriented) perception verb to be evidential, 
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configurations where one finds evidential perception verbs will be discussed in more 
detail in Section 5. And on a final note, the high degree of polysemy one sees evinced 
by perception verbs in general appears in the evidential domain as well (Sweetser 
1990; Harm 2000; Whitt 2010): verbs of visual perception can point to evidence of a 
cognitive nature (like knowledge and understanding), auditory verbs can also be 
markers of hearsay, and verbs of tactile perception can include emotion and intuition 
in their stock of evidential meanings. And all verbs—including those of olfaction and 
gustation—point to inference as the source of evidence, while the connection between 
this inference and the source sensory modality can vary tremendously, i.e. the 
inference may or may not be based on the sensory modality of the verb in question. 
Sometimes the relationship is purely metaphorical. This issue of polysemy will also 
be taken up in Section 5. 
 
3. Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity 
In very general terms, subjectivity in language concerns the degree to which the 
S/W’s presence in the discourse is realized linguistically, and it has been of interest to 
linguistics for quite a long time (see, for example, Bréal 1900: 229-238). With this 
very general definition, one can safely say that evidentiality is subjective because of 
its deictic nature. After all, it allows S/Ws to point to the evidence for the propositions 
they utter, thus making their presence in the discourse known. More recently, two 
competing—although not mutually exclusive in my opinion—views of subjectivity 
have gained prominence. Traugott’s (1982; 1989) view of subjectivity is diachronic in 
nature, concerned mainly with how certain linguistic items become markers of S/W’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the proposition of the subject’s perception has to provide the source for the 
knowledge of some other event or state of affairs, i.e. the state of affairs being 
described adjoins to the act of perception as a secondary predication of sorts 
(Smirnova 2010). 
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point of view. The Old English perception verb felan ‘to feel’ is a good example, 
which by the end of the Old English period had acquired the additional meaning of ‘to 
experience mentally’. This is Stage I of Traugott’s cline of subjectification, whereby 
items that describe external situations come to assume meanings of internal 
(cognitive, evaluative, perceptual) situations as well. In Stage II, markers of 
external/internal situations assume textual or metalinguistic meanings: this is what 
happened with the Early Modern English observe ‘to perceive (that)’, which became 
‘to state (that)’. Finally, in Stage III—when subjectification reaches its zenith—
meanings become concentrated in S/W’s subjective attitudes and assessments. The 
development of epistemic modal meaning out of deontic modal meaning is the 
perennial example of full-blown subjectification. Although the notion of 
subjectification is diachronic in nature, it is useful for synchronic analysis as well. 
Concerning (5) and (6), for example: 
 (5) a. I can see the boat capsizing. 
  b. Ich sehe das Boot umkippen. 
 
 (6) a. I can see that Irene gets along with her parents.3 
  b. Ich sehe, dass Irene sich mit ihren Eltern gut versteht. 
 
In (5), the S/W has visual evidence that the boat is capsizing. Anyone else who has 
visual access to this event should also be able to report the same thing. In (6), 
however, the perception verb see/sehe doesn’t indicate visual perception so much as it 
does inference (which is probably based on visual observation). This could be 
considered more subjective than (5), which is based solely on an external event or 
stimulus. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3According to Palmer (2001: 47) the coupling of the modal verb can with a perception 
verb is idomatic in English and not necessarily indicative of any kind of deontic 
modality. 
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 Langacker’s (1990, 1999, 2008) approach to subjectivity is synchronic in 
nature and is more concerned with overt syntactic realizations of the deictic elements 
(the “ground”) in the discourse. Where there is more deixis, there is more subjectivity 
because the S/W is more “on stage” where the events are occurring: 
 (7) a.  Vanessa jumped across the table. 
  b.  Vanessa is sitting across the table from Veronica. 
  c.  Vanessa is sitting across the table from me. 
  d.  Vanessa is sitting across the table. 
 
To Langacker, (7a) would be considered maximally objective because this event 
description is not dependent on the S/W’s point of view (that is, the S/W is maximally 
“off stage”). In (7b, c), on the other hand, the S/W traces a trajectory from Vanessa to 
someone else. And in (7d), this trajectory from Vanessa (to the self) is not even 
linguistically realized; the S/W is maximally “on stage” here, and the sentence is thus 
considered maximally subjective. Although such insights can prove helpful in dealing 
with evidential object-oriented perception verbs (Whitt 2011: 352), they don’t have 
much to say about subject-oriented perception verbs, where the overt marking of the 
perceiver (I or we) as subject is governed grammatically rather than pragmatically, i.e. 
the S/W has no choice but to indicate who the perceiver is, and so varying degrees of 
Langacker’s subjectivity simply don’t exist. 
 Although briefly touched on in the work of Benveniste (1971 [1966]: 223-
230), intersubjectivity—the linguistic encoding of the S/W’s relationship with the 
addressee in the discourse context (Traugott and Dasher 2002)—has garnered the 
interest of linguists more recently than subjectivity. Honorifics and markers of social 
deixis (such as the contrast between the German Sie ‘you’ (formal) and du ‘you’ 
(informal) as pronouns of address) are classic examples of intersubjectivity, which as 
Traugott and Dasher (2002: 96) point out, can develop out of processes of 
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subjectification and intersubjectification, the latter being a subtype of the former.4 
Concerning evidentiality, Nuyts (2001: 34) has developed a litmus test for 
determining whether something is a marker of subjective or intersubjective evidential 
meaning: “does the speaker suggest that (s)he alone knows the evidence and draws a 
conclusion from it; or does (s)he indicate that the evidence is known to (or accessible 
by) a larger group of people who share the conclusion based on it?” So returning to 
examples (1) and (2), we can see that the auditory evidence appears to be available 
solely to the speaker in (1), but in (2), an unspecified number of other people in 
addition to the speaker have access to this evidence, as indicated by the first-person 
plural pronoun we. In Whitt (2011), it was shown that Nutys’ criterium for 
distinguishing subjective and intersubjective evidentiality, although correct, fails to 
capture the wide array of possible intersubjective meanings found with evidential 
perception verbs. Not only can the S/W indicate that s/he is not the only one with 
access to specific perceptual evidence, but s/he can also use the first-person plural 
pronoun we as a means of bringing evidence to the addressee’s attention, or even in an 
attempt to guide or manipulate the addressee’s interpretation of such evidence (after 
all, the use of we can indicate an assumption of audience agreement, even when there 
is none). This is where Hyland’s (2005) notion of “stance and engagement” becomes 
quite useful. Although evidentiality has long been acknowledged to be part of 
“speaker stance” (see, for example, Biber and Finegan 1989), little has been said as to 
how the S/W might “engage” the audience with certain information or evidence. 
According to Hyland (2005: 176), stance is an “attitudinal dimension” and 
engagement is “an alignment dimension where writers acknowledge and connect to 
others, recognizing the presence of their readers, pulling them along with their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4After all, for something to assume intersubjective meaning, it must first be capable of 
signifying subjective meaning. 
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argument, focusing their attention, acknowledging their uncertainties, including them 
as discourse participants, and guiding them to interpretations”. And as we will soon 
see, it is the first-person plural pronoun we/wir that allows speakers and writers to 
engage their audience in a number of ways with the evidence at hand (see 
Mühlhäusler and Harré 1990: 168-206 for a general discussion of the semantic 
breadth of the first-person plural pronoun in a number of the world’s languages).5 
 
4. The Data 
To see what variety of intersubjective evidential meanings are evinced by the first-
person plural pronoun in English and German, the extant similarities and differences 
between these two languages, and if any recent diachronic developments have 
occurred, a number of corpora representing the Early Modern and Modern periods 
were searched. For English, the Helsinki (Early Modern section) and ARCHER 
Corpora were consulted. The Early Modern section of the Helsinki Corpus contains 
551,000 tokens and covers the years 1500-1700. The ARCHER (A Representative 
Corpus of Historical English Registers) covers the years 1650-1990 and contains 
1,789,309 tokens. For German, the Bonn Corpus of Early New High German, 
containing 608,000 tokens, was consulted for the period 1350-1699. The Goethe and 
Kant Corpora were consulted for eighteenth and nineteenth century data: the latter 
contains 3,338,068 tokens and the former contains 1,400,000 tokens. For twentieth 
century German, the DWDS (Digitales Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache ‘Digital 
Dictionary of the German Language’)—containing ca. 100,000,000 tokens—was 
consulted. Because of the large size of the DWDS in comparison to the other corpora, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5Intersubjectivity does not factor anywhere in Langacker’s model of Cognitive 
Grammar. Verhagen (2005), however, has used Langacker’s framework as a basis for 
developing a syntax-based account of intersubjectivity and construal. 
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the number of attestations of high-frequency perception verbs (like sehen ‘see’ and 
hören ‘hear’) was often much higher than in other corpora. When this occurred, a 
random sample similar in size to the data sets of other corpora was taken (see Whitt 
2010).6 
 One obvious issue that arises concerning the corpora and the use of the first-
person plural pronoun is the issue of genre, i.e. are certain uses of we or wir as 
indexes of intersubjective evidential meaning more prominent in certain genres than 
others? Due to the varying structures of the different corpora, such a question cannot 
be answered in a systematic way in the current study. It is hoped, however, that the 
findings discussed here will lead to genre-based investigations of evidentiality and the 
use of the first-person plural pronoun (for other genre-based investigations of this 
pronoun, see papers in this volume by Temmerman, Vladimirou, Vassileva, Fetzer, 
and Van de Mieroop).7 
 
5. We/Wir and Evidential Verbs of Visual and Auditory Perception 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6The Helsinki Corpus is available from ICAME (http://icame.uib.no/) and The Oxford 
Text Archive (http://ota.ahds.ac.uk/), while the ARCHER Corpus is available only on 
site at universities with participating ARCHER consortium members (see 
http://www.llc.manchester.ac.uk/research/projects/archer/ for more details). The Bonn 
Corpus of Early New High German is available online at 
http://www.korpora.org/Fnhd/, as is the Kant Corpus (http://www.korpora.org/kant/) 
and the DWDS Corpus (http://www.dwds.de). The Goethe Corpus is available within 
the COSMAS II framework of the Institut für Deutsche Sprache (http://www.ids-
mannheim.de/cosmas2/). All hyperlinks accessed on 21.11.11.  7Both the Helsinki and ARCHER Corpora aim to be multi-genre sample corpora for 
the periods they cover. The Bonn Corpus is multi-genre, but it only goes until 1699. 
The Kant and Goethe Corpora were selected for the eighteen and nineteenth centuries 
because—at the time of this article’s writing—no corpus for German comparable with 
Helsinki or ARCHER was available. The German Manchester Corpus (GerManC), 
which covers the period 1650-1800, has recently been completed; however, it will not 
be available until early 2012, which was too late for this essay. And concerning the 
twentieth century, the DWDS Corpus supposedly covers written and spoken German, 
although most of the examples found by the author come from newspapers. 
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 I will now present the results of my corpus-based study on the use of the first-
person plural pronoun as a marker of intersubjective meaning when used with 
evidential verbs of visual (see and sehen) and auditory (hear and hören) perception. It 
was found that these perception verbs always signify evidential meaning when they 
occur in particular complementation patters or other syntactic collocations, and that 
particular evidential meanings are sometimes bound to specific patterns (cf. Hunston 
and Francis 2000). The patterns under investigation in this study are: Perception Verb 
(PV) + Finite Complementizer Clause (FCC), PV + Direct Object (DO) + Non-Finite 
Verb (NFV),8 Parentheticals, and PV external to the “evidentialized” clause (i.e. the 
clause for which there is evidence). 
5.1 See and Sehen 
In this section, I will discuss the effects of the first-person plural pronoun when it 
occurs as the grammatical subject of evidential see and sehen. The quantitative 
distribution of the complementation patterns and relative occurrences of the first-
person plural grammatical subject can be found in Tables 1 and 2:9 
PATTERN Helsinki ARCHER 
PV + FCC 
with we 
50 
  9 (18%) 
102 
  16 (15.7%) 
PV + DO + NFV 
with we 
29 
  5 (17.2%) 
137 
  20 (14.6%) 
Parenthetical 
with we 
  5 
  2 (40%) 
  12 
    - 
External 
with we 
  4 
  2 (50%) 
  12 
    - 
Table 1: Frequencies of intersubjective evidential see in English language corpora 
PATTERN Bonn Kant Goethe DWDS 
PV + FCC 
with wir 
18 
  5 (27.8%) 
39 
29 (74.4%) 
  73 
  19 (26%) 
9 
6 (66.7%) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8In English, the non-finite verbal complement in these constructions can be either an 
infinitive, a present participle, or a past participle. In German, only infinitives and 
past participles are possible. 9For the frequencies of these evidential constructions relative to the use of the use of 
perception verbs in general, see Whitt 2010.	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PV + DO + NFV 
with wir 
  4 
  1 (25%) 
20 
  4 (20%) 
181 





  1 
  1 (100%) 
  3 
  1 (33.3%) 
  13 





  1 
  - 
  3 
  2 (66.7%) 
    2 
    1 (50%) 
1 
- 
Table 2: Frequencies of intersubjective evidential sehen in German language corpora 
From this data we see that the use of the first-person plural pronoun as grammatical 
subject varies considerably within and among the English and German language 
corpora. For the most part, the pronoun’s relative frequency is actually higher in low 
frequency constructions (namely, the parentheticals and external constructions), 
although wir does appear as subject a majority of the time in the DWDS cases of 
finite complementizer clause constructions—which are admittedly quite few when 
compared with the other corpora. Both the PV + FCC and PV + DO + NFV patterns 
enjoy the highest frequency of usage in both English and German, although the 
German wir appears as grammatical subject in these constructions more often than we 
does in English. And as far as diachronic developments are concerned, no clear 
evolution can be discerned in either English or German, for there is no clear-cut 
increase in frequency of we or wir from the Early Modern to the Modern period. 
5.1.1 PV + FCC 
We now turn out attention to the evidential meanings one finds when see or sehen 
takes a finite complementizer clause in its scope, and how the use of the first-person 
plural pronoun adds an intersubjective dimension to these meanings. Consider (8)-
(11): 
(8) Thus we see, that most Resinous Gums, that draw light bodies, do also, 
being moderately solicited by heat, (whether this be excited by the fire, 
or by Attrition or Contusion) emit steams. (Helsinki Corpus: 
CESCIE3B, Robert Boyle, Electricity & Magnetism (1675-1676), pp. 
11-12) 
(9) We therefore see that due to the slower rise of the probability for the 
second type of collision it will make its appearance in this case later 
than it would were the excess energy of the colliding electrons only 0.1 
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volt or less. (ARCHER: 1925dymo.s7b, E. G. Dymond, ‘On the 
Precise Measurement of the Critical Potentials of Gases,’ Proceedings 
of the Royal Society, London, Ser. A 107: 291-309) 
(10) beschauen  wir das Wachstum näh-er,          so     sehen wir, daß,         
 inspect       we  the  growth      closely-more, then see     we  that.COMP 
  in-dem        die Pflanze sich   von    Knoten zu Knoten, von    Blatt zu  
 in-that.DAT the plant   REFL  from  joint     to  joint     from  leaf   to 
 Blatt fortsetzt, in-dem        sie sproßt, gleichfalls eine Fortpflanzung 
 leaf  continue  in-that.DAT it   sprout   likewise    a reproduction 
 geschehe, die         sich  von    der Fortpflanzung durch      Blüte        
 occur      that.REL REFL from the  reproduction    through   flower.PL 
 und Frucht, welche       auf einmal geschiehet, darin     unterscheidet,  
 and fruit      which.REL at    once    occur    therein  differ 
 daß        sie sukzessiv    ist, daß        sie sich in  einer  Folge  
 that.COMP   it successive  be  that.COMP  it REFL in a.DAT series 
  Entwickelung-en zeigt. 
 development-GEN.PL show 
 (Goethe Corpus: Zur Naturwissenschaft im Allgemeinen/Morphologie 
(1817-1824), Hamburger Ausgabe, Band 13, S. 99) 
 ‘If we inspect the growth more closely, then we see that where the 
plant continues from joint to joint, from leaf to leaf, by sprouting 
sprouts, a reproduction also occurs, and this propagation differs from 
that which occurs with flowers and fruit, which occurs at once, and it is 
different insofar as it is successive, that shows itself to result as a 
consequence of a series of individual developments’. 
(11) Wir sehen mehr und mehr, daß     Länd-er,        die  
 we  see     more  and more  that-COMP  country.PL-NOM.PL   that.REL   
  bisher   unsere    Abnehmer     waren,  selbst  zu-r         Produktion  
 hitherto we.POSS customer.PL   be.PST  REFL   to-DAT.PL  Production  
übergehen. 
 transition 
 (DWDS Corpus: “Deutscher Reichstag”, in: Vossische Zeitung 
(Morgen-Ausgabe), 04.03.1908, S. 15) 
 ‘We see more and more that countries that hitherto were our customer, 
have themselves transitioned to production’.  
 
It should be more than clear from these examples that when see or sehen takes a finite 
complementizer clause, the type of evidence is not restricted to literal visual 
perception. Oftentimes there is a more metaphorical notion of knowledge or 
understanding at play (Sweetser 1990: 32-34; cf. Lakoff and Johnson 2003), although 
visual perception may still be part of the meaning as well. Some sense of observation 
is certainly present in (8)-(14), and it is this observation that leads to more mental 
processes of inference and conclusion. And we/wir certainly plays a role in how this 
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evidence is presented to the audience. In (8), (10), and (11) on the one hand, it appears 
that the authors deploy the first-person plural pronoun not necessarily to indicate that 
a number of people have made this observation, but rather to draw this (visual) 
evidence to the audience’s attention and explain how exactly this evidence should be 
perceived. Thus in (10) Goethe brings various aspects of the plant’s growth—which is 
visually perceptable—to his audience’s attention and guides them step-by-step 
through a series of observations. In (9), Dymond appears to go a step further with his 
use of we. Rather than merely bringing visual evidence to his readers’ attention, he 
then attempts to persuade his audience that a certain conclusion should be drawn from 
this evidence, i.e. when exactly the gas should appear and why this is indeed the case. 
These are perfect examples of Hyland’s (2005) notion of “engagement”: the authors 
use the first-person plural pronoun to bring evidence to their audience’s attention and 
then successively guide how they view and then interpret such evidence. 
5.1.2. PV + DO + NFV 
When a perception verb takes a direct object and a non-finite verb as its complement, 
more literal perception than found in uses such as (9) tends to be signaled: 
(12) And yet ther is no greate cause, when we see the trees & herbes reviue 
agayn in their fittist place, that as much as nature will permitt, they 
may not  soone dry & dye. (Helsinki Corpus: CEBOETH2, Queen 
Elizabeth (trans.), Boethius (1593), p. 67) 
(13) In cool blood, yet with firm attachment, we now see blended in her, the 
peerlessness of enterprise, the deportment, ardor and heroism of the 
veteran, with the milder graces, vigor and bloom of her secreted, softer 
sex. (ARCHER Corpus: 1797mann.f4a, Deborah Sampson and Herman 
Mann, The Female Review) 
(14) Gleichwohl   sehen wir kein-en           der-gleich-en    sich   
 nevertheless see      we  none-ACC.SG  the-same-ACC.SG         REFL  
  ausnehmend   unterscheidend-en  Fix-stern  unter  dem  
 exceptionally distinguish-ACC.SG  fix-star     under  the.DAT 
 Himmelsheere hervorschimmern. 
 heaven  glimmer.INF 
  (Kant Corpus: AA I, Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des 
Himmels (1755), S. 328) 
‘Nevertheless we see no fixed star glimmering in the heavens that 
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exceptionally distinguishes itself’. 
(15) . . . und je  lebendig-er irgend    ein Wissen      in uns 
       and ever lively-more something  a    knowledge  in we.DAT     
  wird,     desto mehr sehen wir uns    getrieben,        es in  seinem  
 become the    more see      we REFL   drive.PST.PTCP it  in  it.POSS.DAT 
 Zusammenhange aufwärts und abwärts        zu verfolgen. 
 coherency     upwards  and downwards  to pursue.INF  
 (Goethe Corpus: Tag- und Jahreshefte (?), Hamburger Ausgabe, Band 
10, S. 498) 
‘. . . and the more lively any knowledge becomes in us, the more we 
see ourselves compelled to pursue it upwards and downwards in its 
coherency’. 
 
In (12) and (14), the perception being indicated appears quite literal: the “revival” and 
growth of the flora in (12) and the position of the stars in (14). Through the use of we 
and wir, the authors simply point out that such phenomena are there to see for anyone 
who cares to look. In (13), this sense of vision is more general, focusing on general 
observations in someone’s behavior than “vision” of one particular event or 
phenomenon. There is also more a sense of engagement here, as the authors employ 
the first-person plural pronoun to draw the reader’s attention to the woman’s 
demeanor, as if they were occupying the same physical space as the woman being 
described. Example (15) is quite interesting, for here, not only does Goethe draw his 
audience along for the ride with his choice of plural pronoun subject and reflexive 
pronoun object, but he also suggests that his audience should engage in these 
intellectual pursuits when they come to find any knowledge (irgend ein Wissen) 
exciting or interesting.  Sehen maintains its general sense of observation here, but 
because its object is a reflexive pronoun, the observation is of the self (or selves, 
thanks to wir) engaging in intellectual endeavors. Or at least Goethe suggests this is 
what his audience should observe themselves doing in such a situation. 
5.1.3 Parentheticals 
Parenthetical constructions are particularly interesting, for unlike the other 
complementation patterns, they always convey a sense of intersubjective evidentiality 
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because “they allow the S/W to interrupt the flow of discourse and make a comment 
to the addressee” (Whitt 2011: 356), i.e. they engage the audience with the evidence 
at hand. Still, parentheticals can have a variety of uses (see Whitt 2011; cf. Ifantidou 
2001; Nuyts 2001) and the focus here will be on those few attestations involving the 
first-person plural pronoun: 
(16) This course we see hath been very effectual in a short time, with some 
more ripe witted children, but othres of a slower apprehension (as the 
most and best commonly are) have been thus learning a whole year 
together . . . (Helsinki Corpus: CEEDUC3B, Charles Hoole, A New 
Discovery of the Old Art of Teaching Schoole (1660), p. 4) 
(17) Und hierin hat     also, wie wir sehen, die Mathematik   einen Vorzug  
 and  herein have  thus  as   we  see  the mathematics  a.ACC  priority 
  vor       der   Philosophie, daß           die Erkenntniss-e    der 
 before  the.DAT philosophy   that.COMP  the  insight-NOM.PL the.GEN  
 erster-n             intuitive, die     der         letzter-n        hingegen  nur  
 former-.GEN.SG intuitive  those  the.GEN latter.GEN.SG however  only   
  discursiv-e             Erkenntnisse  sind. 
 discursive-NOM.SG realization.PL be 
 (Kant Corpus: AA IX, Logik (1800), S. 23) 
‘And here mathematics has a priority over philosophy, as we see, for 
the insights of the former are intuitive, while those of the latter are, on 
the other hand, only discursive realizations’. 
 
In both these instances, the evidential perception verb is not the main thrust of the 
proposition but rather a “personal aside” (Hyland 2005: 183) that allows the writer to 
emphasize to the reader that the specified conclusion is one that should in fact be 
reached when the observable evidence is taken into account. In (16), Hoole suggests 
that the positive effects of certain teaching practices should be clear to anyone who 
can observe them, while in (17), Kant suggests to his audience that they should also 
arrive at the conclusion that mathematics takes priority over philosophy. 
5.1.4 External Constructions 
When a perception verb appears external to a clause for which it indicates that 
evidence exists, the relationship is then indicated either via anaphora/cataphora or 
asyndeton: 
	   17 
(18) An inquisitiue man is a pratler: so vpon the like reason, a credulous 
man is a deceiuer: as we see it in fame, that hee that will easily beleeue 
rumors, will as easily augment rumors, and adde somewhat to them of 
his owne, which (^Tacitus^) wisely noteth, when he sayth: (\Fingunt 
simul creduntq\) ; so great an affinitie hath fiction and beleefe. 
(Helsinki Corpus: CEEDUC2B, Francis Bacon, The Twoo Bookes of 
the Proficience and Advancement of Learning (1605), 21V) 
(19) Daß       die Zwek-e          der         Vorsehung  nicht immer  die  
 that.COMP the goal-NOM.PL the.GEN  providence  not   always those   
  der        Mensch-en        seyn       dürfen, sehen wir hieraus:   Die Liebe  
 the.GEN person-GEN.PL  be.INF    may      see      we herefrom  the  love    
  soll   mehr  auf Eltern   als    auf Kind-er          gehen, aber die Natur  
 shall more  to   parents  than  to   child-ACC.PL go        but   the nature  
 wirkt umgekehrt. 
  work backwards 
 (Kant Corpus: AA XIX, Erläuterungen zu A. G. Baumgartens Initia 
philosophiae practicae primae (1760), S. 464) 
 ‘That the goals of providence may not always be those of people, we 
see from this: love should go more to parents than to children, but 
nature works the opposite way’. 
 
In (18), Bacon points out that the credulous man is observable among the famous, and 
the object of see, the pronoun it, refers to information or a proposition located 
elsewhere in the discourse (anaphorically in this instance concerning the previous 
statement on the nature of credulous men), rather than a specific entity. The use of we 
makes clear that such observations are there for all to see. In (19), an asyndetic 
relationship exists between the clause involving the perception verb and the 
proposition for which there is observable evidence, i.e. the nature of love between 
parent and child. Of course, the presence of the adverb hieraus ‘herefrom, from it’ 
adds a cataphoric element as well, as it points the reader onwards for more 
information (although there is no formal conjunction linking the two clauses). And as 
with (18), the use of the first-person plural pronoun draws the reader along with 
Kant’s observations and suggests that these observations are available not just to 
Kant, but to his readership as well. 
5.2 Hear and Hören 
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We now turn our attention to evidential uses of hear and hören, verbs of auditory 
perception, and what role the first-person plural pronoun plays in the construction of 
intersubjective evidential meaning among these verbs. Tables 3 and 4 present the 
quantitative distribution of the relevant constructions in the English and German 
language corpora: 
PATTERN Helsinki ARCHER 
PV + FCC 
with we 
36 
  3 (8.3%) 
102 
  53 (52%) 
PV + DO + NFV 
with we 
20 
  - 
  68 
    3 (4.4%) 
Parenthetical 
with we 
  5 
  - 
  21 
    5 (23.8%) 
External 
with we 
  4 
  - 
    9 
    - 
Table 3: Frequencies of intersubjective evidential hear in English language corpora 
 
PATTERN Bonn Kant Goethe DWDS 





  - 
30 
  4 (13.3%) 
  18 
  13 (72.2%) 




  7 
  - 
62 
  9 (14.5%) 
  10 





  4 
  - 
  9 
  2 (22.2%) 
163 
  77 (47.2%) 
External 1 
1 (100%) 
  - 
  - 
  1 
  - 
    - 
    - 
Table 4: Frequencies of intersubjective evidential hören in German language corpora 
 
Unlike with see and sehen, the corpora do point to some sort of diachronic 
development with the use of the first-person plural pronoun as grammatical subject of 
evidential hear and hören: there is a noticeable increase in frequency of we from the 
Helsinki to the ARCHER Corpus, and in German, the use wir as subject increases in 
both the PV + FCC and parenthetical constructions.10 On the other hand—in contrast 
to see and sehen—there appear to be several more instances than with the visual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10Exactly what accounts for this infrequency is unclear, however. The DWDS Corpus, 
for example, appears to have a number of parentheticals involving hören that far 
exceeds any other corpus. This skewing may be due to a large number of newspaper 
texts being the source of DWDS data, so genre effect could be one of the culprits. 
Still,  further investigations are necessary before a clear answer can be given. 
	   19 
perception verbs where we or wir never appears as subject of certain complementation 
patterns involving hear or hören.  
5.2.1 PV + FCC 
 
The presence of hearsay evidence is what is almost exclusively indicated when either 
hear or hören appears with a finite complementizer clause. And when we/wir appears 
as the subject, the availibility of this evidence to number of people—rather than just 
the S/W—is signaled: 
 (20) We hard that Capten Lawndrey (\and\) the French had taken St.  
  Mychaels, one of the Azores in behalf of the King of Portingal.  
  (Helsinki Corpus: CEDIAR2A, Richard Madox, The Diary of Richard 
  Madox (1582), p. 133) 
 (21) Dieweil      wir   hie    in dies-er         Weissagung hören/ das  
  Meanwhile we   here  in this-DAT.SG  prophecy     hear     that.COMP  
   Gott auf     seinen   Sohn die  Sünde geworffen/     vnd  jhn       
  God upon  his.ACC son    the  sin.PL cast.PST.PTCP and he.ACC  
  zu-m        Opffer für vns        gemacht   hat . . . 
  to-the.DAT victim for we.ACC make.PST.PTCP  have.AUX 
  (Bonn Corpus: Text 145, Johannes Mathesisu, Pasionale (1587), Blatt 
  51 Verso) 
  ‘Meanwhile we hear here in this prophecy that God has cast the sins 
  upon his son and has made him a sacrifice for us . . .’ 
 
In (20), Madox appears to indicate in his diary that he—along with an unspecified 
number of other people—can report about the French seizure of St. Michaels because 
they have hearsay evidence at their disposal. In (21), although there is hearsay 
evidence at hand (via the prophecy), there is an additional sense of audience 
engagement, as Mathesisu appears to bring this evidence to the audience’s attention 
(or at least remind them thereof) through the mention of the prophecy, i.e. he points 
his audience in the direction of the prophecy as the source of the hearsay evidence. 
5.2.2 PV + DO + NFV 
In contrast hearsay, direct auditory perception is the dominant type of evidence one 
finds in this construction, and the use of the first-person plural pronoun signals that 
this evidence is available to more people than just the S/W alone: 
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 (22) wee can heare now and then a Harquebusse or a Musket goe off,  
  which they doe seldome discharge in vaine . . . (Helsinki Corpus:  
  CETRAV2A, John Taylor, The Pennyless Pilgrimage (1630), p.  
  136.C1) 
(23) wir haben ganz null-e             Gedichte wegen  
 we  have   completely worthless-SG.ACC  poem.PL  because   
 lobenswürdig-er        Rhythmik   preisen      hören. 
 commenable-SG.GEN rhythmics  praise.INF  hear.INF 
 (Goethe Corpus: Schriften zur Literatur (?), Hamburger Ausgabe, 
Band 12, S. 350) 
 ‘We have heard completely worthless poems praised because of their 
commendable rhythmics’. 
 
Both events being described here are ones which can be perceived directly rather than 
indirectly through hearsay: the firing of muskets in (22) and the praising of worthless 
poems (nulle Gedichte) in (23). And both these events are perceived by a number of 
people besides the S/W (or, in the case of (23), assumed to have been perceived by 
others in addition to Goethe himself). This complementation is not completely 
inconducive to marking hearsay evidence, however: in English, the use of the particle 
of in this construction shifts the focus from direct auditory perception to hearsay: 
(24) We have heard too much, of the troops and ships coming over,  
 we suppose you mean; we have not heard more, if more there  
 be. (ARCHER: 1776leac.d4a, John Leacock, The Fall of British  
 Tyranny) 
 
In this instance, the arrival of the “troops and ships” is not perceived directly, but only 
reported to have happened. And the S/W, associating himself with a larger speech 
community through the use of we rather than I, indicates he is not the only one is 
possession of this hearsay evidence. 
5.2.3 Parentheticals 
When verbs of hearing appear in parenthetical constructions, they are always 
indicators of hearsay rather than direct auditory perception: 
 (25) On Friday last arrived here from London, via New-York, Mr. William 
  Young, Botanist to their Britannick Majesties; with his wife, who is, 
  we hear, a most amiable woman. (ARCHER Corpus:   
  <1773nyo1.n4a>, The New York Journal) 
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 (26) Der neue Sommer-fahrplan ist,        wie wir hören, jetzt aus dem 
  the  new  summer-schedule be.AUX  as   we  hear    now by  the.DAT 
   Ministerium der        öffentlich-en     Arbeit-en       der  
  ministry       the.GEN  public-GEN.PL work-GEN.PL  the.DAT 
   Eisenbahndirektion    Berlin  zugestellt          worden. 
  regional administrative office  Berlin  subpoena.PST.PTCP become.AUX 
  (DWDS Corpus: Berliner Tageblatt (Morgen Ausgabe), 03.03.1905, S. 
  5) 
  ‘The new summer schedule, as we hear, has now been subpoenaed  
  from the regional administrative office of Berlin by the Ministry of 
  Public Works’. 
 
Neither the behavior of Young’s wife in (25) nor the actions of the Ministry of Public 
Works in (26) are—or can be for that matter—perceived by direct auditory 
perception. Rather, the writers here indicate that this is reported information, and they 
then make these reports (hearsay) available to their audience through the use of the 
first-person plural pronoun. 
5.2.4 External Constructions 
Unfortunately, in all of the examined corpora, there was only one instance of a first-
person plural grammatical subject appearing with a verb of auditory perception in an 
external construction. Our attestation comes from the Bonn Corpus of Early New 
High German: 
 (27) Wir haben-s mit    vnserm  Ohr-en        gehört/          vnsere  
  we  have-it   with  our.DAT ear-DAT.SG hear.PST.PTCP our.NOM.PL   
   Vätter     haben-s vns        erzehlt;         Ein Tag verkündiget dem  
  father.PL have-it   we.DAT tell.PST.PTCP a     day declare  the.DAT 
   ander-n         das  Wort; vnnd eine Nacht gibt  der         anderen       die  
  other-DAT.SG the  word  and   a      night  give  the.DAT  other-DAT.SG   
  die Wissenschafft. 
  the scholarship. 
   (Bonn Corpus: Text 157, Johann Rosenthal, Außführliche Widerhol- 
  und Vermehrung . . . (1653), S. 18) 
  ‘We have heard it with our ears, our fathers told it to us: one day  
  declares the word to the other, and one night gives scholarship to the 
  other’. 
 
Here, the perception is not of any particular event, but rather of a set phrase that has 
been passed down through the generations. Still, the content of the phrase could well 
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be considered hearsay, and the evidence at hand (the propositional content of the set 
phrase) is one of received wisdom or common knowledge rather than completely new 
information (see Willett 1988, cf. Sweetser 1990: 23-48). 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this essay I have attempted to show how the use of the first-person plural pronoun 
with evidential verbs of perception allows speakers and writers not only to indicate 
their evidence for the proposition, but also to “engage” (Hyland 2005) their audience 
with the evidence at hand. Both English and German, the two languages under 
examination here, show great similarity in this domain. Instead of merely indicating 
the presence of evidence, which is what occurs with the first-person singular pronoun, 
the use of we and wir allows speakers and writers to indicate they share certain 
evidence with a larger speech community, that they wish to disseminate this 
information to a larger community, or even that they are attempting to guide their 
audience’s interpretations of and conclusions based on this evidence. Evidential 
perception verbs appear in a number of complementation patterns, and the type of 
evidence expressed—and consequently the type intersubjective meaning conveyed—
can differ from construction to construction (this has been more obvious with the 
verbs of auditory perception here). The verbs of visual perception can be used to 
indicate either vision or general observation (direct evidence) on the one hand or  
more internal mental states like knowledge and inference (indirect evidence) on the 
other hand. Similarly, the verbs of auditory perception are also capable of signaling 
either direct (hearing) or indirect (hearsay) evidence. Although diachronic data has 
been under consideration here, no significant developments in the domain of 
intersubjective evidential meaning could be detected. And finally, the examples here 
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(mostly from academic texts and newspapers) suggest there may well be genre effects 
regarding the use we and wir to signal intersubjective evidential meaning, so this is 
certainly an area deserving further investigation. 
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